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THE INTERNATIONAL RULE OF LAW* 
William W. Bishopf 
IN contrast with the previous lectures in this series on the Rule of Law, we are today not concerned with how the Rule of Law 
operates in a highly organized modem state like our own United 
States; but are turning instead to the world-wide community ( or 
perhaps more properly international arena or international sphere 
of action, since the very word "community" may over-emphasize 
the degree of common sentiment!), in which the present role of 
the law is far less than within the state. Our first question is 
whether there is in fact any such thing as an international Rule of 
Law, or something approaching it. We may be like the legendary 
essayist on "Snakes in Ireland," who simply wrote, "There are no 
snakes in Ireland." Some would dismiss our topic by saying, 
"There is no international rule of law." If I agreed with them, I 
would sit down and we would all be spared anything further in 
this lecture. But I do not believe that such would be an accurate 
appraisal; such a quick denial of the international Rule of Law 
would not correspond to reality of today. 
Thus it becomes necessary to inquire in some detail how far 
we do have anything which may properly be described as the 
international Rule of Law, to speculate a bit why we do not have 
more, and to ask what may be done to bring about a more effective 
Rule of Law internationally. 
What do we mean by "international Rule of Law"? Without 
precise definition, I believe we could agree that the concept in-
cludes reliance on law as opposed to arbitrary power in interna-
tional relations; the substitution of settlement by law for settlement 
by force; and the realization that law can and should be used as 
an instrumentality for the cooperative international furtherance 
of social aims, in such fashion as to preserve and promote the values 
of freedom and human dignity for individuals. Charles Rhyne, 
former American Bar Association President, said: 
"The rule of law within nations ... connotes the existence 
of the hundreds of legal rules, the legal procedures, courts, 
and other institutions which in sum total add up to order and 
• Lecture delivered on June 27, 1960, as part of a series of lectures on the general 
topic, "Post-War Thinking About the Rule of Law," given in connection with the Special 
Summer School for Lawyers held at The University of Michigan Law School, Ann Arbor, 
June 20-July I, 1960.-Ed. 
t Professor of Law, University of Michigan.-Ed. 
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stability, equality, liberty, and individual freedom. . . The 
rule of law among nations means the regulation of mutual 
intercourse of nations, and international contacts and relations 
of individuals, by legal concepts, standards, institutions and 
procedures. "1 
Before going further, let me clarify two points. In dealing 
with the international Rule of Law, we are not discussing the nor-
mal application of international law by national courts in appro-
priate cases coming before those courts.2 Nor are we concerned 
primarily with the disputes of individuals with other individuals 
who are separated by national boundaries. Such disputes and re-
lations are reasonably well handled by national courts and national 
laws, in accordance with conflict of laws principles - although 
greater unification of private law in some fields would be welcome, 
and greater uniformity of conflict of laws rules desirable. For such 
disputes between individuals there is also commercial arbitration, 
powerfully encouraged by the Arbitration Association, Interna-
tional Chamber of Commerce, and similar groups.3 
Our real problem arises when one or more governments become 
parties to the controversies; when there is a dispute between an 
individual (or corporation) and a foreign government, or between 
the governments of two or more nations. It is to this situation that 
we look this afternoon. In our consideration of this topic, let us 
remember the strong support for the international Rule of Law 
expressed by Executive, congressional, and judicial officers of our 
own Government and of foreign democracies, and the interest of 
various groups of practicing lawyers, represented particularly by 
the American Bar Association's Special Committee on World 
Peace Through Law.4 President Eisenhower said two years ago, 
l Opening statement before Boston Conference on World Peace Through Law, March 
27, 1959. A.B.A. Special Committee on World Peace Through Law, THE RULE OF I.Aw 
AMONG NATIONS: DIGEST OF PROCEEDINGS OF REGIONAL CONFERENCES OF LAWYERS 47 (1959). 
2 Cf. statement of Mr. Justice Gray, in The Paquete Habana, 175 U.S. 677, 700 (1900): 
"International law is part of our law, and must be ascertained and administered by the 
courts of justice of appropriate jurisdiction, as often as questions of right depending upon 
it are duly presented for their determination." See also Dickinson, Changing Concepts and 
the Doctrine of Incorporation, 26 AM. J. INT'L L. 239 (1932); Dickinson, The Law of 
Nations as Part of the National Law of the United States, 101 U. PA. L. REv. 26 and 792 
(1952-53). 
8 See DOMKE, INTERNATIONAL TRADE ARBITRATION (1958). 
4 See Rhyne, address as President of A.B.A., World Peace Through Law, 44 A.B.A.J. 
937 (1958), also in 83 A.B.A. REP. 624 (1958); Rhyne, World Law or World Holocaust, 
81 N.Y. ST. B.A. REP. 30 (1958); Report of Special Committee on International Law Plan-
ning (T. E. Dewey, Chairman), 83 A.B.A. REP. 566 (1958); and documentation of the 
A.B.A. Special Committee on World Peace Through Law. Note also the work of the 
World Rule of Law Center at Duke Law School (Arthur Larson, Director}, and that Cen-
ter's DESIGN FOR RESEARCH ON INTERNATIONAL RULE OF I.Aw (1960). 
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on "Law Day U.S.A.": "In a very real sense the world no longer 
has a choice between force and law. If civilization is to survive, it 
must choose the rule of law."5 In 1919 Woodrow Wilson ·wrote: 
"What we seek is the reign of law based upon the consent of the 
governed and sustained by the organized opinion of mankind."0 
Senator Robert Taft declared, Sept. 25, 1947: "I do not see how 
we can hope to secure permanent peace in the world except by 
establishing law between nations and equal justice under law."7 
Referring to the ABA Special Committee on World Peace Through 
Law as " 'practical idealism' at work," former Governor Adlai 
Stevenson said, Oct. 21, 1959: "Building peace is the most impor-
tant job in the world today. It cannot be built by arms. It can 
only be built by law."8 Pointing to the need to establish the rule 
of law so as to "provide a way of settling disputes among nations 
as it does among individuals," Vice-President Nixon declared, 
April 13, 1959: "If we are to rule out, as we have and should, the 
use of force or threats of force as a means of settling differences 
where negotiations reach an impasse, the sole alternative is the 
establishment of the rule of law in international affairs."9 
How far has the world gone in the adoption of an international 
Rule of Law? What sort of law and courts do we now have in the 
international sphere? How well do they work, and why don't they 
do a better job? Here we are concerned with international law, that 
system of customary rules and international agreements considered 
by nations as legally binding on themselves in their dealings with 
one another and with each other's citizens. 
Our present system of international law grew up in the 16th 
and 17th centuries among Western European states that had be-
come sovereign, that is to say, independent of any temporal supe-
rior, and yet were in need of some means of regulating and making 
more predictable their relations with each other. Widespread 
theories of a natural law which obligated individuals and nations 
alike, and a common background of Roman law and of Christian-
classical ethical and intellectual traditions, made it easier for the 
idea of an international law, binding on independent sovereign 
states, to take root. Building upon what seems a curious hodge-
5 Statement of April !JO, 1958, 38 DEP'T STATE BULL. 831 (1958), quoted in A.B.A., 
Special Committee on World Peace Through Law, COMPILATION OF QUOTATIONS 4 Gan. 
1960). 
6 Quoted id. at 5. 
7 Quoted id. at 11. 
s Quoted id. at 12. 
9 Quoted id. at 5. 
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podge of recorded international practice, legal doctrines of Roman 
law and canon law, ethical and philosophical speculations, and 
whatever else came to mind, the law writers of 300 and 400 years 
ago formulated principles and rules of international law. To a 
greater or lesser extent their statements were accepted and acted 
upon by nations in their practice, and then in turn succeeding 
writers drew both upon the earlier ·writers and the resulting prac-
tice of states. Through this repeated interaction of jurist and prac-
tical statesman, the ideas and natural-law philosophy of some of 
these "classical" writers on international law, like the I 7th-century 
Grotius and 18th-century Vattel, had a tremendous influence upon 
the development of international law. For the last century and a 
half, however, it is to international customary law and international 
agreements, to the positive law actually followed by nations, that 
we turn, rather than to natural law speculations of the writers. 
Today, in seeking the sources of international law10 we begin 
with treaties, which lay down rules binding on the countries in 
question. Internationally, treaties take the place of both contract 
and statute in domestic law, since between the parties to a treaty 
the provisions thereof supersede customary international law. 
Secondly, we look to "international custom, as evidence of a 
general practice accepted as law." Here we have the foundation 
of our international legal system, and meet the difficulties encoun-
tered when we look critically at any customary law. The practice 
must be "general," and must be accepted as legally binding. But 
it is hard to say how many nations must follow a practice before 
it is "general," what difference it makes which nations these are 
and whether there is conflicting practice or express opposition to 
the alleged custom, whether it is necessary that the particular 
nations in controversy are among those which can be shown to 
have accepted the practice. 
As a third source, international courts are directed to follow 
also "general principles of law recognized by civilized nations," 
although in practice much less reliance seems to have been placed 
upon this source. 
Finally, at least as "subsidiary means for the determination of 
rules of law," in international law we look to prior decisions of 
international tribunals or of national courts dealing with inter-
national law, and to the "teachings of the most highly qualified 
10 For the sources of international law, see Statute of International Court of Justice, 
art. 38, 59 Stat. 1060 (1945). The language quoted in the text is that of this article 38. 
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publicists of the various nations." In so doing, we must bear in 
mind that stare decisis is not a part of international law, and that 
our ideas of precedent are not found in the legal systems followed 
by the larger part of the world. Nevertheless, customary inter-
national law has largely developed from case to case, and an in-
creasing number of these cases have been submitted to international 
tribunals or have been decided by national courts. Decisions of 
the courts help to form custom, and they show us what courts have 
accepted as international law.11 As for the writers, we must re-
member Mr. Justice Gray's admonition, in The Paquete Habana, 
[175 U.S. 677, 700 (1900)] that, "Such works are resorted to by 
judicial tribunals, not for the speculations of their authors concern-
ing what the law ought to be, but for trustworthy evidence of what 
the law really is." 
What organs for its law work does the international community 
possess? I would answer: a partially developed judicial system, a 
considerable body of administrative machinery, and no organized 
executive or legislative organs such as we find within the modern 
state. Even casual study of its Charter shows how the United 
Nations differs from what we think of as the executive or legis-
lative branches of a government. Our international legislative 
process is solely that of agreement upon treaties by all the nations 
bound by them; we have no international legislature empowered 
to enact by majority votes laws obligatory on those not taking part 
in the legislative process. 
Turning to institutions for the settlement of international dis-
putes by application of law, what sort of courts do we find to deal 
1\Tith controversies between nations, or between a nation and those 
individuals or companies who are alien to that nation? Frequently 
during the past 160 years nations have resorted to international 
arbitral tribunals of their mm creation. They have formed ad hoc 
tribunals to hear and decide either some single controversy or a 
group of cases. The state itself is usually regarded as plaintiff or 
defendant in such cases, although the real interest may be that of 
individuals aggrieved by the conduct of those for whom the defend-
ant state is responsible. Often these tribunals consist of one person 
11 In Thirty Hogsheads of Sugar v. Boyle, 13 U.S. (9 Cranch) 191, 198 (1815), Chief 
Justice Marshall wrote for the Court, concerning international law: "The decisions of the 
courts of every country, so far as they are founded upon a law common to every country, 
will be received, not as authority, but with respect. The decisions of the courts of every 
country show how the law of nations, in the given case, is understood in that country, and 
will be considered in adopting the rule which is to prevail in this." 
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named by each side and a neutral umpire; sometimes more arbi-
trators are used, and sometimes only a single judge. The exact 
questions to be decided, and the procedure to be followed, must 
be agreed upon by the states concerned. Decision, usually by ma-
jority vote, is through application of international law to the facts 
found by the tribunal, although the parties may agree on special 
rules to be followed. While within our country parties resort to 
arbitration because they want to keep out of the courts, interna-
tional arbitration has been regarded as judicial settlement by an 
"ad hoc court," since nations have used this device in order to 
obtain a decision by law when there was no suitable court for the 
purpose or because they believed that the arbitral tribunal could 
do the particular judicial job better than any other available inter-
national court. International arbitration has, therefore, generally 
been treated as an international judicial procedure. 
Since 1920 we have had the "World Court" at The Hague, first 
established as the Permanent Court of International Justice,12 and 
then in the 1945 creation of the United Nations transformed into 
the International Court of Justice.13 This court consists of fifteen 
judges (only one from any nation), elected for nine-year terms by 
majority votes of the United Nations General Assembly and of the 
Security Council. It is required that in the court "as a whole the 
representation of the main forms of civilization and of the principal 
legal systems of the world should be assured." Although the United 
States did not join the court until 1945, there has always been an 
American citizen among its judges.14 
Only states (not individuals or corporations on the one hand, 
nor international organizations on the other) can be parties in 
cases before the court, although UN agencies and other interna-
tional organizations may ask for advisory opinions. The "World 
Court" has jurisdiction over disputes which both parties to the 
controversy agree to lay before the court. This may be done by 
special agreement after the dispute arises, or states may agree in 
advance to give the court jurisdiction over particular types of dis-
putes arising between them - usually those involving interpreta-
12 See HUDSON, THE PERMANENT COURT OF INTERNATIONAL JusnCE, 1920-1942 (1943). 
13 For the treaty under which the court is established, see 59 Stat. 1055 ff. (1945). See 
also ROSENNE, THE INTERNATIONAL COURT OF JusnCE (1957); LISSrIZYN, THE INTERNATIONAL 
COURT OF JusncE (1951); LAUTERPACHT, THE DEVELOPMENT OF INTERNATIONAL LAW BY THE 
INTERNATIONAL CoURT (1958). 
14 Americans who have served as judges of the "World Court" have been, successively, 
John Bassett Moore, Charles E. Hughes, Frank B. Kellogg, Manley 0. Hudson, and Green 
H. Hackworth (the present incumbent). Philip C. Jessup takes office in 1961. 
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tion and application of some treaty.15 Beyond this, those nations 
who wish to do so may, in relation to others accepting the same 
obligation, accept in advance the jurisdiction of the court as com-
pulsory in all legal disputes concerning (a) the interpretation of 
a treaty, (b) any question of international law, (c) the existence of 
any fact which, if established, would constitute a breach of an 
international obligation, or ( d) the nature or extent of the repara-
tion to be made for the breach of an international obligation.16 
Thirty-nine nations are now subject, in varying degrees, under this 
"optional clause" to the compulsory jurisdiction of the Court in 
legal disputes as thus defined when the plaintiff state has also 
accepted this jurisdiction.17 These include the United States, 
United Kingdom, France, Nationalist China, India and Japan; but 
the Soviet Union and all other Communist nations are conspicu-
ously absent. Even this compulsory jurisdiction is in some in-
stances cut down by the terms on which it is accepted. The United 
States, for example, limits our acceptance by the self-judging pro-
viso of the Connally Amendment, that acceptance does not apply 
to "disputes with regard to matters which are essentially within 
the domestic jurisdiction of the United States of America as deter-
mined by the United States of America," thus rendering our ac-
ceptance of compulsory jurisdiction to a large extent illusory.18 
Under the UN Charter, each member of the UN "undertakes 
to comply with the decision" of the court in any case to which 
15 For example, Art. 26 of the Treaty of Friendship, Commerce and Navigation 
between the United States and Italy, signed Feb. 2, 1948, provides: "Any dispute between 
the High Contracting Parties as to the interpretation or the application of this Treaty, 
which the High Contracting Parties shall not satisfactorily adjust by diplomacy, shall be 
submitted to the International Court of Justice, unless the High Contracting Parties shall 
agree to settlement by some other pacific means." 63 Stat. 2255, 2294. 
10 This so-called "optional clause" is art. 36, para. 2, of the Statute of the International 
Court of Justice, 59 Stat. 1060 (1945). 
17 A.B.A. Special Committee on World Peace Through Law, THE RULE OF LAw 
AMONG NATIONS: BACKGROUND INFORMATION 7 (1960). 
18 Emphasis added. United States acceptance of Aug. 26, 1946, 15 DEP'T STATE BULL. 
452 (1946), 61 Stat. 1218 (1946). At present such "self-judging" limitations qualify the 
acceptance of compulsory jurisdiction by Liberia, Mexico, Pakistan, South Africa, and 
Sudan, as well as the United States. See generally Briggs, Reservations to Acceptance of 
Compulsory Jurisdiction of the International Court of Justice, Hague Academy of Inter-
national Law, 93 RECUEIL DES CoURS 223 (1958). 
Because of the reciprocal features of compulsory jurisdiction of the Court, if the 
plaintiff state has qualified its acceptance of jurisdiction, the defendant state may take 
advantage of this qualification even though its own acceptance of jurisdiction was given 
unconditionally. Thus in the Case of Certain Nonvegian Loans, brought by France against 
Nonvay when France's acceptance was limited by a provision similar to the Connally 
Amendment, the Court decided that it was without jurisdiction to adjudicate upon the 
dispute. [1957] I.C.J. Rep. 8. (France has since withdrawn this limitation upon her 
acceptance of jurisdiction.) 
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it is a party; if a party "fails to perform the obligations incumbent 
upon it under a judgment rendered by the Court, the other party 
may have recourse to the Security Council, which may, if it deems 
necessary, make recommendations or decide upon measures to give 
effect to the judgment."19 
Although the Perm.anent Court of International Justice had 
rather more business between the two World Wars, since 1946 the 
International Court of Justice has been markedly underworked. 
It has given judgment on the merits in about a dozen cases and 
rendered advisory opinions on about a dozen questions. Quite a 
number of other cases have been dismissed for lack of jurisdiction. 
Many international controversies which appear suitable for judicial 
settlement have not been submitted to the court ( often because 
jurisdiction over the defendant state was obviously lacking),20 
while UN organs have been slow to seek advisory opinions. 
In addition to the International Court of Justice, we must not 
lose sight of the effective Court of Justice of the European Commu-
nities, created for the European Coal and Steel Community and 
broadened to serve also as the court for the European Economic 
Community and Euratom.21 Although it is geographically and 
functionally limited to the "Inner Six" European nations in the 
Communities, this court is a real step forward toward the interna-
tional rule of law. Nor should we forget the recently-established 
19 United Nations Charter, art. 94, 59 Stat. 1051 (1945). See also Schachter, The En-
forcement of International Judicial and Arbitral Decisions, 54 AM. J. INT'L L. 1 (1960). 
20 "Other legal disputes which might have been submitted to the Court during the 
period since 1946 include those relating to: the validity of Kashmir's accession to India; 
India-Pakistan sharing of river waters; the right of prisoners of war in Korea to refuse 
repatriation; the Peruvian seizure of the Onassis and other ships; the Egyptian claim of 
the right to bar Israel from the use of the Suez Canal and passage through the Gulf of 
Aqaba; the objections of Japan and others to U.S. nuclear bomb tests over the high seas; 
French seizure of Algerian emissaries on airplane from Morocco; Egyptian nationalization 
of the Suez Canal; Icelandic fishery laws; Indonesian seizures of Dutch property; the status 
of Formosa and the off-shore islands; the question of West New Guinea; the Allies' right 
of access to West Berlin; Tibet's right to independence from Communist China; and 
hundreds of individual claims, accumulating in foreign offices throughout the world, of 
denials of justice according to international law. The defendants in most of these disputes, 
if they had been filed, would have been entitled to deny the jurisdiction of the Court on 
the ground that they or the plaintiffs had not accepted the compulsory jurisdiction of the 
Court or that their acceptance or the plaintiffs' acceptances were subject to reciprocally 
applicable reservations." A.B.A. Special Committee on World Peace Through Law, THE 
RULE OF LAW AMONG NATIONS: BACKGROUND INFORMATION 15 (1960). 
21 Concerning this court, see VALENTINE, THE COURT OF JUSTICE OF THE EUROPEAN COAL 
AND STEEL COMMUNITY (1955); Stein, The European Coal and Steel Community: the Be-
ginning of its Judicial Process, 55 CoLUM. L. REv. 985 (1955); Stein, The Court of Justice 
of the European Coal and Steel Community, 1954-1957, 51 AM. J. INT'L L. 821 (1957); 
STEIN &: NICHOLSON, AMERICAN ENTERPRISE IN THE EUROPEAN COMMON MARKET-A LEGAL 
PROFILE, vol. I, ch. II, The New Institutions (by E. Stein) and ch. VII, New Legal Reme-
dies of Enterprise (by E. Stein and P. Hay) (Michigan Legal Studies, 1960). 
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European Court of Human Rights,22 concerned with the problems 
of individual human rights in the European countries accepting its 
jurisdiction. 
While international arbitration and decision by the "World 
Court" are the two principal means for the use of law in the settle-
ment of international disputes, we must not overlook the impor-
tant part law may play in the settlement of disputes by direct nego-
tiation, or in connection with mediation, conciliation, or adjustment 
of controversies through political bodies such as the Security 
Council, General Assembly, or Organization of American States.23 
In focusing our attention as Ia-wyers upon the institutions ap-
plying law to the settlement of international disputes, we must not 
forget that the most frequent use of law internationally lies in 
action taken according to its rules rather than in litigation or the 
settlement of controversies. The daily reliance upon international 
law as a standard of conduct in the normal relations between na-
tions far exceeds in frequency, and may well equal in importance, 
its role as a basis for the settlement of disputes. 
Why do states comply with international law, in so far as they 
do? The sanctions of international law appear to be a mixture, in 
proportions depending on the circumstances, of the forces of public 
opinion, habit, good faith, expediency, self-help, and reciprocal 
advantage when the law is followed and fear of retaliation if it is 
broken. Within the modem state the rule of law is backed by read-
ily available force, indeed by more or less a monopoly of force in 
governmental hands, as well as by prevailing law-abiding senti-
ment. International law is usually quite well observed, in so far 
as its demands on states are not very exacting. However, we need 
means for compelling observance of the law internationally, which 
do not result in violence and evils far greater than the violation. 
But we must remember that the weaknesses of international law 
to meet the needs of the present day lie deeper than any mere ques-
tion of sanction. As Brierly so well pointed out: 
"It is not the existence of a police force that makes a system 
of law strong and respected, but the strength of the law that 
makes it possible for a police force to be effectively organized. 
22 See Robertson, The European Court of Human Rights, 9 A11r. J. CoMP. L. I (1960). 
23 "These varied methods of facilitating agreement between parties to a dispute 
provide opportunities for statesmanship. Their success depends on the skill with which 
they are used by the statesmen concerned •••• 
"The capacity of either party to a dispute to demand arbitration or judicial settlement 
as a last resort probably facilitates negotiation." A.B.A. Special Committee on ·world Peace 
Through Law, THE RULE OF LAW AMONG NATIONS: BACKGROUND INFORMATION 19 (1960). 
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The imperative character of law is felt so strongly within a 
highly civilized state that national law has developed a ma-
chinery of enforcement which generally works smoothly, 
though never so smoothly as to make breaches impossible. If 
the imperative character of international law were equally 
strongly felt, the institution of definite international sanctions 
would easily follow."24 
With the world organized as it is, we must recognize that inter-
national law has not in the past been able to deal with the delib-
erate law-breaker; that nations have not been willing to act in such 
fashion as to put power behind the law. We may ask whether the 
imminent possibility of destruction of the greater part of the popu-
lation and resources of the world by nuclear weapons and other 
instruments of warfare, may force even reluctant statesmen to rec-
ognize the advantages of following the law when departure from 
it may in serious matters bring such consequences. 
Is there any obligation, either in law or in fact, to use law and 
these international agencies? Article 33 of the United Nations 
Charter does require that, 
"The parties to any dispute, the continuance of which is 
likely to endanger the maintenance of international peace and 
security, shall, first of all, seek a solution by negotiation, en-
quiry, mediation, conciliation, arbitration, judicial settlement, 
resort to regional agencies or arrangements, or other peaceful 
means of their own choice."215 
In Article 2, paragraph 3, members of the United Nations agree 
that "All Members shall settle their internationl disputes by peace-
ful means in such a manner that international peace and security, 
and justice, are not endangered."26 But despite these general pro-
visions, the weakest point in our present international legal system 
lies in the fact that, except as parties may by treaty contract other-
wise, the jurisdiction of international courts is purely voluntary; 
an unwilling defendant violates no law in merely declining to have 
the controversy dealt with by processes of the law. In the absence 
of specific agreement conferring jurisdiction, there is no means 
whereby a would-be plaintiff nation may bring another into court 
without the latter's consent, or obtain a judgment by default if it 
fails to appear. On this point President Eisenhower well said, "We 
24 BRIERLY, THE LAw OF NATIONS 73 (4th ed. 1949). 
25 59 Stat. 1042 (1945). 
26 Id. at 1037. 
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have . . . at least the structure and machinery of an international 
rule of law which could displace the use of force. What we need 
now is the universal will to accept peaceful settlement of disputes 
in a framework of law."27 
Herman Phleger, former Legal Adviser of the Department of 
State, recently declared: "We have plenty of law and plenty of 
mechanics for judicial determination of legal disputes, but there is 
no general will on the part of governments to resort to the existing 
law and the existing mechanics. The great problem is to change 
the climate of public opinion."28 It is in this respect that the cur-
rent movements for the world rule of law may hope to accomplish 
the most, through bringing about the desire to use the interna-
tional law and international judicial machinery we already have. 
But this is not the sole answer. We must ask what types of 
international disputes are susceptible to adjudication. There is 
much truth in the assertion that whether an international dispute 
is justiciable depends on the attitude of the parties; it is justiciable 
if both parties want to have it decided on the basis of law. How-
ever, as Sir John Fischer Williams cautioned years ago, "the more 
serious disputes, those which involve the more fundamental issues, 
are those where a change in the law is sought."29 Brierly suggests 
that, 
"The analogy of the compulsory jurisdiction of municipal 
courts is in many ways deceptive. For one thing, they are 
part of an elaborate social organization which provides for the 
enforcement of legal rights as such, and there is no near pros-
pect of that in the international field. . . . In the last resort 
there is no escape from the fact that judicial process, national 
or international, can settle a dispute in the sense of finally 
disposing of it only on one of two conditions; either the par-
ties must be willing, or they must be compellable, to accept 
their rights according to law in full settlement of their de-
mands. "30 
International law may give a solution to any controversy, but a 
solution which leaves the unsatisfied party with merely a declara-
tion that it has no legal rights to a change in the situation may 
prove no satisfactory solution. Even within the state, there is con-
27 Message for "Law Day U.S.A." April 30, 1958, 38 DEP'T STATE BULL. 831 (1958). 
28 A.B.A. Special Committee on World Peace Through Law, THE RULE OF LAW AMONG 
NATIONS: DIGEST OF PROCEEDINGS OF REGIONAL CONFERENCES OF LAWYERS 32 (1959). 
20 WILLIAMS, INTERNATIONAL CHANGE AND INTERNATIONAL PEACE 5 (1932). 
30 BRIERLY, THE Oun.ooK FOR INTERNATIONAL I.Aw 120, 122-23 (1944). 
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stant need for legislation, for keeping the law up to date with social 
changes; but in the international sphere we have no such legislative 
process except as all the parties concerned may be willing to join 
in a treaty to bring about the change. 
We must further distinguish the types of controversy suitable 
for settlement by a court from those calling for political adjustment. 
The question of the right of passage through the Suez Canal, or of 
the right to divert and use part of the flow of an international 
river, is a legal question susceptible of judicial settlement if the 
parties are willing. But the appropriate way in which to divide 
the waters of the Indus between India and Pakistan so as to bring 
about the fairest and most beneficial use of these waters for the 
good of both countries calls for a basis of decision other than the 
existing law. The question whether, by cutting off access to Berlin, 
the Soviet Union (or East Germany) would violate international 
obligations, is a justiciable question; the question what should be 
done about the future of Germany is a political question falling 
outside the special competence of courts. 
In sum, how far is our present system inadequate to give us a 
true international Rule of Law? I should be among the last to 
disregard the highly useful services now rendered by international 
law (and by international courts and international organizations); 
but I must mention some of its obvious weaknesses. One can read-
ily point to the lack of obligation to use the law and means for 
settlement of disputes by application of the law, to the lack of the 
organized type of sanction we find in modern domestic law and 
which we need internationally if settlement by law is to replace 
settlement by use or threat of force, to the uncertainty of many 
international law rules (particularly on the customary side), the 
smallness of its range in so far as it allows nations complete discre-
tionary control over many matters which actually affect the inter-
ests of other nations, the slowness of its development, and the great 
difficulties in bringing about by lawful means changes in the legal 
.situation to meet an ever-faster-changing world. 
Basically, our difficulty is that the peoples and governments of 
the world are not ready for the surrender of sovereignty to any type 
of world government, even on a most limited basis or on a federal 
model. Professor Jessup thoughtfully remarked a decade ago, 
"Until the world achieves some form of international govern-
·ment in which a collective will takes precedence over the individ-
ual will of the sovereign state, the ultimate function of law, which 
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is the elimination of force for the solution of human conflicts, will 
not be fulfilled."31 
But even if we doubt that a complete realization of the inter-
national Rule of Law is probable without extensive alteration in the 
world's political structure,32 let us look at some current develop-
ments relevant to our subject in the world as it is. 
First, we must take note of the sudden expansion of the inter-
national community as new nations achieve independence and con-
duct their own foreign relations. Particularly in Asia and Africa, 
nations are becoming independent at such a rate that it is hard to 
keep up with them! International law began as a legal system 
among European nations with common ideas and ideals and fairly 
similar domestic laws. The American republics, commencing with 
the United States, were in the same tradition. Turkey was "admit-
ted to the family of nations" in 1856; and Japan, China and others 
gradually followed. But since the end of World War II, think of 
the ever-lengthening list of new states taking their places in inter-
national affairs and international organizations: Philippines, Ko-
rea, India, Pakistan, Burma, Ceylon, Lebanon, Syria,33 Jordan, 
Israel, Indonesia, Libya, Sudan, Morocco, Tunisia, Ghana, Guinea, 
Cambodia, Vietnam, Laos, Malaya, Cameroun, Togo, Mali Fed-
eration, and more to come like Congo, Somalia, Nigeria, Malagasy, 
Sierra Leone, Cyprus, and others. While the world is glad to see 
these countries achieve self-determination and independent con-
trol of their own affairs, these nations are by no means always happy 
to accept all the customary rules laid down by older members of 
the international community before they had acquired independ-
ent statehood. Some, at least, among these newer nations lack any 
widespread acceptance of those values and ideas which pervaded 
the international community when our system of international law 
grew up. Other nations, like the Soviet Union and Communist 
China, have broken with the Western past, and although still ac-
cepting international law on a pragmatic basis, no longer reinforce 
that law by the values and ideals which aided its development. 
These events have placed a great strain upon international law 
and its instrumentalities. The "official doctrine" of the interna-
tional community still follows what Daniel Webster wrote in 1842 
as Secretary of State: 
81 JESSUP, A MODERN LAW OF NATIONS 2 (1948). 
82 Cf., for example, CLARK & SOHN, WORLD PEACE THROUGH WORLD LAw (1958). Of 
course many other plans for altered international political institutions have been suggested. 
ss Now combined with Egypt in the United Arab Republic. 
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"Every nation, on being received, at her own request, into 
the circle of civilized governments, must understand that she 
not only attains rights of sovereignty and the dignity of na-
tional character, but that she binds herself also to the strict and 
faithful observance of all those principles, laws, and usages 
which have obtained currency among civilized states .... No 
community can be allowed the benefit of national character 
in modern times without submitting to all the duties which 
that character imposes."34 
But anti-colonial memories, and short-range interests during the 
"cold war," weaken the effectiveness in relations with these new 
nations of many parts of international law other than those em-
bodied in treaties specifically accepted by them. Here is a real 
danger of a trend away from the international Rule of Law. 
To balance this, we may note the growth of international 
organization in the past decades. Alongside the establishment of 
the League of Nations and then more recently the United Nations, 
we see also the development of old and new specialized functional 
agencies dealing with everyday international problems of health, 
labor, agriculture, education, money, mails, aviation, telecommu-
nications, meteorology, shipping, atomic energy, and the like.3" We 
have important regional or defense organizations like the Organi-
zation of American States and the North Atlantic Treaty Organiza-
tion. We must not lose sight of the effective work of bilateral 
international organizations like the International Joint Commis-
sion which deals with boundary waters between the United States 
and Canada, or the International Boundary and Water Commission 
between the United States and Mexico, which has built and oper-
ates international dams. Of course we cannot forget the "supra-
national" European economic organizations, whose agencies and 
rules operate directly upon individuals and corporations as well as 
upon member states. 
This growth of international organizations brings legal prob-
lems concerning their status internationally and before national 
authorities, their relations with each other, the legal position of 
34 Secretary Webster to the American Minister to Mexico, April 15, 1842, quoted in l 
MOORE, DIGEST OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 5 (1906). 
35 For the constitutional documents of international organizations, see PEASLEE, INTER-
NATIONAL GOVERNMENTAL ORGANIZATIONS: CONSTITUTIONAL DOCUMENTS (1956). For current 
developments, use the quarterly, INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATION. Concerning the work of 
international organizations, see BECKEL, WORKSHOPS FOR THE WORLD (1954); LEONARD, 
INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATION (1951); HILL, INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATION (1952); CLAUDE, 
SWORDS INTO PLOWSHARES (1956). 
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international organization employees, and above all the interpre-
tation and application of the treaties under which they are set up 
and function. The "constitutional law" of each such organization 
grows rapidly, while with what may be called "parliamentary di-
plomacy"36 their rules of procedure become increasingly impor-
tant. Their assemblies and councils afford yet further fora for the 
discussion and adjustment of international problems, with more 
or less use of international law in the process. Their deliberations 
frequently result in treaties to regulate and promote the activities 
with which they are concerned. Such organizations provide much 
of the administrative machinery we associate with governmental 
handling of problems, and law is important in their daily function-
ing. They make a valuable contribution toward the international 
Rule of Law, particularly when technical questions outweigh politi-
cal considerations. 
In international law today, the most noticeable phenomenon 
is the amazing number, variety and complexity of international 
agreements, or treaties, which represent purposeful development 
of the law and which so largely replace custom in most fields by 
more clearly defined rules chosen by the parties to meet their needs. 
Treaties deal with an almost infinite variety of subject-matter: the 
UN Charter, mutual defense, commerce, consular functions, taxa-
tion, standardization of vaccines and health measures, rights of air-
lines of one country to do business with another, etc., etc. Most of 
the cases heard by the "World Court," and most of the interna-
tional legal problems which today arise in legal practice or between 
foreign offices, involve international agreements. 
As the law contained in treaties has become the predominant 
part of our field, the principles and practices pertaining to the 
making, effect, application, interpretation, modification and ter-
mination of treaties become an ever more vital part of international 
customary law. More and more we depend on the notion of pacta 
sunt seroanda; our gain in clarity of international rules and their 
suitability to human needs may come at the expense of that habit-
ual conformity to law and tradition which characterizes all custom-
ary law. This growth of the written international law, comparable 
to the great growth of legislation in the internal law of most coun-
tries and at the same time reminiscent of the change "from status 
to contract" sometimes found by some observers in the history of 
private law, renders more and more acute the problem of the bind-
86 See Jessup, Parliamentary Diplomacy, Hague Academy of International Law, 89 
RECUEIL DES CoURS 181 (1956). 
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ing force of treaties, and of the possibilities of their lawful modifi-
cation or termination. 
We have developed "mechanics" of making international agree-
ments which serve our ends quite well [ whether we think of agree-
ments approved by the Senate which we call "treaties" for consti-
tutional purposes, or those entered into by the Executive alone 
or by the Executive in conjunction with both Houses of Congress, 
which we call "executive" or "executive-congressional" agree-
ments]. Whether negotiated and concluded between two nations 
by diplomats in traditional formal style, or handled informally as 
exchanges of notes, or drafted at international conferences as com-
promises resulting from a series of majority votes, we have ade-
quate means for expressing those rules and principles upon which 
nations can agree. In these agreements, however arrived at, we 
need careful and imaginative draftsmanship to avoid difficulties of 
interpretation, and we need provisions ensuring that such disputes 
as may arise concerning the agreement will be submitted to courts 
or arbitration for settlement according to law. 
The normal requirement of unanimous consent among the 
parties to each international agreement may be slowly disappear-
ing; by consent in advance nations may agree to be bound by later-
adopted rules to which they do not give specific formal assent. 
Thus the Halibut Conventions37 between the United States and 
Canada provide that fishing regulations adopted each year by a 
commission under the treaty shall be effective on approval by the 
President and the Governor-General, without need to go through 
the treaty-making process each time. In the technical annexes to 
the 1944 Chicago Civil Aviation Convention,38 amendments be-
come effective for all parties when adopted by two-thirds vote of 
the Council, unless within three months a majority of the parties 
to the treaty register their disapproval. Under the UN Charter, 
amendments may be adopted by two-thirds of the membership and 
obligate even those who oppose them, provided all five permanent 
members of the Security Council concur in the amendment.39 
Even with all that is being done to improve the international-
agreement process, we must remember how far it falls short of true 
"legislation." We do not have rules laid down by any higher body 
which nations must follow, but a process which at some stage re-
37 Convention signed May 9, 1930, 47 Stat. 1872; Convention signed Jan. 29, 19~7, 50 
Stat. 1351; Convention signed March 2, 1953, 5 U.S. TREATIES 5, or T.I.A.S. No. 2900. 
38 61 Stat. 1180. 
39 U.N. Charter, art. 108, 59 Stat. 1053 (1945). 
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quires the agreement of each nation to be affected. We have made 
only the slightest moves away from the requirement of unanimous 
agreement. The fundamental basis remains, that no state is bound 
without its consent. As Marshall wrote so long ago in The Ante-
lope, [23 U.S. (IO Wheat.) 66, 122 (1825)]: "No principle of gen-
eral law is more universally acknowledged than the perfect equality 
of nations. Russia and Geneva have equal rights. It results from 
this equality that no one can rightfully impose a rule on another." 
One reason for technical international legal progress in matters 
relating to the making of agreements is that no nation is obligated 
to enter into a treaty unless it wants to. But where the law does 
come into conflict with strong state policy, difficulties arise. When 
one nation wants to escape the obligations of a treaty it has accept-
ed, or to stop performing, but another party to the treaty wants to 
keep it in force and demands performance, there is trouble. Here 
we may find disregard of treaties admittedly in force, unless the 
reasons for performance outweigh those for breach. This situation 
brings up questions whether there is a right to terminate a treaty 
unilaterally because of violation by the other party, and as to the 
effect of changed circumstances upon the continuing validity of a 
treaty when the parties did not provide for this contingency. The 
customary international law on these questions is not clear. The 
problem becomes how far those responsible for determining state 
policies will judge that the general interest in maintaining the 
sanctity of treaties is superior to the immediate gain they may see 
in repudiating a burdensome treaty obligation. In this area the 
best hope for progress toward an international rule of law would 
seem to lie in making effective provision for the determination of 
these cases, involving alleged rights to terminate for violation or 
change of circumstances, by impartial international judicial or 
political bodies.40 
Another significant development is the breakdmvn of bounda-
ries between international law and national laws as they are applied 
in practice. Whether in private practice or as government official, 
the fawyer usually meets international law questions intermixed 
with the domestic law of one or more countries. More and more 
frequently legal questions also arise in specialties such as interna-
tional air law, international taxation, international telecommuni-
cations, international copyright, international narcotics control, 
40 Cf. Harvard Research in International Law, Law of Treaties, 29 AM. J. INT'L L. 
Supp. 653, 1077-1126 (1935). 
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health controls, conservation, and the like, where the specialized 
subject-matter becomes a unifying theme for international law and 
national law dealing with a common problem. Lawyers and govern-
ment officials tend to think of aviation, taxation, radio, copyright, 
or narcotics, rather than to distinguish between the national and 
international sources of the rules involved. More and more of 
international law today affects the individual directly. In many 
areas we may see a difference between the growth and effectiveness 
of the law applied in joint regulation of individuals by govern-
ments, and the slower and more doubtful development of rules 
designed to restrain state action. What may be called "treaty-laws" 
come to play a more important part alongside the older "treaty-
contracts." I would suggest that in this whole area in which nations 
cooperate to regulate or promote individual activities, interna-
tional law is most likely to afford a successful means of dealing with 
the questions which arise, since political feelings are not so high 
and both states concerned feel an obvious common interest in pro-
moting ( or repressing) the activity involved. In this limited field 
the international Rule of Law is fast growing. 
On the other hand, in the last decade or so we see considerable 
de-emphasis of international adjudication, at least as compared 
with the inter-war period or with earlier hopes. There is less resort 
to the "World Court" or to international arbitration, and fewer 
states are willing to undertake the obligations of compulsory juris-
diction. There appears to be a growing preference for non-judicial 
settlement of international disputes; settlement by direct negotia-
tion41 or international organizations are favored. One may see 
here a certain analogy to the domestic efforts of lawyers to keep 
their clients out of court. We must further remember that the 
exalted and trusted position of courts internally in Europe and the 
Americas is not shared by courts in all other parts of the world 
such as the Soviet Union or many Asiatic lands. Whether we like 
it or not (and as an American lawyer I don't like it!), the emphasis 
is shifting away from the settlement of international disputes by 
the judicial application of international law, and toward the spe-
cific agreement of the parties negotiated within the general frame-
work of the law and expressed as a treaty. This trend from inter-
national adjudication toward negotiated settlement raises serious 
problems for the international rule of law. Political and military 
41 Sometimes followed by apportionment by a domestic claims commission of the sum 
paid between various claimants. 
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power undoubtedly play a greater part in such negotiated settle-
ments than in judicial decisions. On the other hand, many disputes 
are not so easily susceptible of judicial decision, and call for politi-
cal adjustment. The international legal order must include proc-
esses of political adjustment as well as judicial settlement. Formu-
lation of, and agreement upon, generally applicable rules of inter-
national law may be less practicable and less useful than the 
achievement of orderly solutions to particular problems in view 
of their peculiar facts.42 When we contrast the relatively small 
number of independent states in the world and the enormous fac-
tual differences between these states, with the thousands and mil-
lions of individuals who live in even a small modern state, we 
readily see why solution by general uniform rules may be less suit-
able in controversies between states than within the state. But if 
the international Rule of Law is to have room for such means of 
dealing with problems, as it must, safeguards must be worked out 
to ensure that the solutions do conform to the Rule of Law and do 
not depend solely upon arbitrary use or threat of power. Third-
party settlement may not be quite essential to the Rule of Law 
internationally, but attempts to dispense with it may negate the 
Rule of Law altogether. 
Finally, overshadowing these developments which may be of 
interest chiefly to international law specialists is one overwhelming 
fact: the disappearance of any safe or practicable alternative to the 
use of law, in an age when nations have such ability to destroy each 
other. We need only call attention to the all too obvious implica-
tions of a world where several powers are armed with atomic and 
hydrogen bombs, missiles, instrumentalities for chemical and bio-
logical warfare, and so on, to see that the old alternative of the 
actual resort to force for the settlement of international disputes 
(instead of mere threat of force or fear that it might be used) has 
lost much of its appeal even for those nations which might not care 
much for the law! 
With the world as it is, and in the light of these current develop-
ments, what may be done in a practical way to bring about a greater 
approach to the international Rule of Law? Under-Secretary of 
State Herter wisely said: 
-!2 See Brierly, The Rule of Law in International Society, 7 NORDISK TIDSSKRIFT FOR 
INTERNATIONAL RET, ACTA SCANDINAVICA JURIS CENTIUM 3, 9 ff. (1936), reprinted in BRIERLY, 
THE BASIS OF OBLIGATION IN INTERNATIONAL LAw AND OTHER. PAPERS 250 (1958). See also 
DICKINSON, LAW AND PEACE, ch. 1 (1951). 
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"[T]he further development of the rule of law among na-
tions must come through a slow evolutionary process. It will de-
pend in the first instance on the growth of mutual comprehen-
sion among all nations of the need for the peaceful machinery 
of law and of the horrors of the alternative machinery of war. 
Thereafter it will depend on the spread of confidence born of 
experience slowly accumulated in practical application of the 
machinery and technique of law."43 
First, I would suggest that our own country, and other nations, 
make greater use than we have made of the legal machinery we now 
have. In cooperation with other nations, we could make far more 
use of the International Court of Justice for the decision of legal 
controversies ( or for advisory opinions on legal questions before 
international organizations) than we have in the past. We should 
work for greater acceptance of the compulsory jurisdiction of the 
International Court, taking the lead instead of "dragging our heels" 
through the effect and influence of the self-judging limitation on 
our acceptance of compulsory jurisdiction found in the Connally 
Amendment.44 Here the Executive and leading members of Con-
gress have strongly urged that we give up the right to determine 
which questions are domestic as opposed to which are international, 
and follow the Statute of the International Court in letting the court 
decide according to international law whether it does or does not 
have jurisdiction. President Eisenhower well said at Delhi Univer-
sity last December, "It is better to lose a point now and then in an 
international tribunal and gain a world in which everyone lives at 
43 37 DEP'T STATE BULL. 223, 228 (1957). 
44 Note 18 supra. Concerning efforts to repeal the Connally Amendment, see Hearings 
on Compulsory Jurisdiction, International Court of Justice, Jan. 27 and Feb. 17, 1960, 
before U.S. Senate, Committee on Foreign Relations, 86th Cong., 2d Sess., on S. Res. 94. 
Urging elimination of this limitation on U.S. acceptance, see President Eisenhower, State 
of the Union Message, Jan. 7, 1960, 42 DEP'T STATE BuLL. 111, 117-18 (1960); and corre-
spondence between President Eisenhower and Senator Humphrey, id. at 128. 
Urging repeal of this "self-judging" Connally Amendment, see further Preuss, The 
International Court of Justice, the Senate and Matters of Domestic Jurisdiction, 40 AM. 
J. INT'L L. 720 (1946); Briggs, The United States and the International Court of Justice: 
A Re-examination," 53 id. 301 (1959); A.B.A. Section of International and Comparative 
Law, REPORT ON THE SELF-JUDGING ASPECT OF THE UNITED STATES' DOMESTIC JURISDICTION 
REsERVATION TO rrs ADHERENCE TO THE STATUTE OF THE INTERNATIONAL COURT OF JumCE 
(1959), reprinted in Hearings, supra at 281. 
In 1947 the American Bar Association took action urging withdrawal of this "self-
judging" American limitation. 72 A.B.A. REP. 82, 378 (1947). In September 1960, it 
refused to change from this stand. 
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peace under the rule of law."45 Where we can, we should insist 
on the inclusion in treaties of provisions to the effect that contro-
versies over their interpretation or application should be submitted 
to the International Court of Justice. 
Secondly, if there is a real disposition to use international legal 
processes, nations like our own might well consider the establish-
ment of permanent local international tribunals to deal with the 
thousands of international claims for injuries to individuals at the 
hands of foreign governments, now gathering dust in the files of 
foreign offices until the day when arbitral tribunals are set up. In-
dividuals might well be given direct access to such tribunals in 
their mm name, with as inexpensive a procedure as practicable.46 
Possibly chambers of the International Court of Justice, meeting 
in various parts of the world, could be used for this purpose. 
Third, there is much room for useful work in bringing about 
international cooperative compilation of international customary 
law, and making the law easier to find47 as well as more clearly 
defined,48 through codification work of the UN International Law 
Commission49 and more widespread publication of sources. 
45 Address at Delhi University, Dec. 11, 1959. Quoted in A.B.A. Special Committee on 
,vorld Peace Through Law, COMPILATION OF QuoTATIONS 4 Gan. 1960). 
46 See A.B.A. Special Committee on World Peace Through Law, THE RULE OF LAw 
AMONG NATIONS: BACKGROUND INFORMATION 23-25 (1960). See also Borchard, The Access of 
Individuals to International Courts, 24 AM. J. INT'L L. 359 (1930); JESSUP, A MODERN LAW 
OF NATIONS 18, 32-34 (1948); BISHOP, INTERNATIONAL LAW CAsES AND MATERIALS 207-09 
(1953). 
-¼7 "The sources of international law are widely scattered. To get the law one must 
gather together and distill evidence accumulated from centuries of custom, international 
judicial and arbitral decisions, domestic decisions, writings of experts, publicists and diplo-
mats, treaties, and many other sources. There is at the present time no adequate systematized 
compilation of the above. If we are ever to have a world rule of law it is obvious that 
there must be a current and complete set of source materials of international law which 
would include reports, digests, indices and commentaries. We all realize how difficult it 
would be to do an acceptable job of domestic research without such tools as the American 
Digest System, National Reporter System, and American Law Reports Annotated. Pre-
vious efforts to create such practical tools in the international law field have met with only 
partial success." A.B.A. Special Committee on World Peace Through Law, THE RULE OF 
LAW AMONG NATIONS: BACKGROUND INFORMATION 30 (1960). 
Steps in this direction have been made in the national digests of international law 
prepared by Moore (1906) and Hackworth {1940-44) and published by the United States 
Government; and in the excellent series founded by Lauterpacht as the Annual Digest of 
Public International Law Cases and continued as International Law Reports, which cover 
international and national court decisions since 1919. 
48 The late Sir Hersch Lauterpacht, who served as the British member of the Inter-
national Law Commission and later as judge of the International Court of Justice, wrote: 
"[O]nce we approach at close quarters practically any branch of international law, we are 
driven, amidst some feeling of incredulity, to the conclusion that although there is as a 
574 MICHIGAN LAW REVIEW [ Vol. 59 
Fourth, we must strive for the better handling of non-justiciable 
disputes by political means but in conformity with the law. In our 
enthusiasm as lawyers for the use of the judicial process, we must 
not forget the need for orderly change in legal rights through 
negotiation assisted by political processes. As nations see the over-
whelming need for peaceful settlement rather than reliance on the 
threat or use of force, we may hope to see progress in dealing with 
disputes where a change in the law is needed. 
Finally, above all we must as lawyers try to bring about a better 
public understanding5° of the need for international law, of what 
we now have in the way of international law, of our existing means 
for making that law and using that law, and a stronger conviction 
that with the present powers of military destruction resort to law 
instead of force becomes increasingly vital. If enough people in 
enough countries want the international Rule of Law, we can go 
a long way toward it even under present international political 
institutions. 
rule a consensus of opinion on broad principle-even this may be an overestimate in some 
cases-there is no semblance of agreement in relation to specific rules and problems .••• 
The fact, which is both disquieting and chastening, speaks for itself. There is, upon 
reflection, nothing astonishing about it. How could it be otherwise in a society in which 
judicial settlement is sporadic, in which there is no legislative activity in the accepted 
sense and in which custom is slow of growth and controversial in interpretation and appli-
cation?" Codification and Development of International Law, 49 AM. J. INT'L L. 16, 17, 19 
(1955). 
49 On the work of the International Law Commission, established by the United 
Nations to assist in the codification and progress development of international law, see 
the YEARBOOKS OF THE INTERNATIONAL LAw COMMISSION. See also LAUI'ERPACHT, op. cit. supra 
note 48; and Stone, On the Vocation of the International Law Commission, 57 CoLUM. L. 
REv. 16 (1957). 
150 Perhaps the best introduction to a better understanding of international law is 
BRIERLY, LAw OF NATIONS (1st ed. 1928; 5th ed. 1955). See also BISHOP, INTERNATIONAL 
LAw CASES AND MATERIALS (1953); and the quarterly AMERICAN JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL 
LAW. 
